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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
Courts continue to encounter difficulties when accounting for the rights and liabilities 
of co-owners of real property when co-ownership relationships come to an end and 
the shared property is sold or partitioned. The courts’ role is to use the proceeds of the 
jointly owned property to meet the legal and personal obligations that have arisen 
between the co-owners during the course of the co-ownership relationship. The three 
primary areas which have presented particular difficulty to the courts are occupation 
fees, improvements and repairs and rents and profits and will be considered 
respectively by this paper in Chapters II, III and IV. The questions with which the 
courts have had to grapple with include: Under what circumstances should co-owners 
who do not occupy the shared property during the term of the co-ownership (herein 
referred to as ‘absentee co-owners’) be allowed to seek an occupation fee from the co-
owners who remain in occupation (herein referred to as ‘occupying co-owners’)? 
Furthermore, under what circumstances should an occupying co-owner who incurs 
outgoings in relation to the property, be allowed a contribution from the absentee co-
owner? Finally, if the occupying co-owner receives rental income or derives profit 
from the shared property, do they need to account to the absentee co-owners for a 
proportion of the sums received? 
  
Disputes of this nature have been described as ‘acrimonious’ by Professor Butt,1  and 
                                                             
1 Peter Butt, Accounts between co-owners (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 410, 410. 
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in answering the questions above, the common law and equity courts developed 
principles that aimed to achieve fairness or justice between the parties. It has been 
widely accepted that courts should approach equitable accounting flexibly so as to 
achieve broad justice between the parties.
2
 In this regard, cases discussing equitable 
accounting principles often turn to the principles found in the judgments of 
Muschinski v Dodds
3
 and Baumgartner v Baumgartner,
4
 where it was held that equity 
will give the minimal equity necessary to relieve the conscience of the legal owners’5. 
Courts have also upheld the maxim of a co-owner seeking equity having to do equity.
6
 
For example, an absentee co-owner cannot take a proportion of the increase in value 
to the property without contributing to the expenditures made by the occupying co-
owner. In giving effect to this theme of fairness, Griffiths L.J. in Bernard v Josephs
7
 
reasoned that: 
 
‘If one co-owner has kept up all the mortgage payments, he is entitled to credit for 
the other co-owner’(s) share of the payments; if he has spent on recent decoration 
which results in a much better sale price, he should have credit for that’8.  
 
However, the guidance of fairness offered by Anglo-Australian cases becomes too 
much of a formal enquiry into the financial position of the parties in the aftermath of 
                                                             
2 See for example, Dennis v McDonald [1982] Fam 63, 1050-1051 (Purchas J). 
3 (1985) 160 CLR 583. 
4 (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
5 Hogan v Baseden (24 November 1997, Butterworths Unreported Cases BC9706190). 
6 Teasdale v Sanderson (1864) 33 Beav 534; 55 ER 476.  
7 [1982] 1 Ch. 391. 
8
 Ibid, 405. 
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the co-ownership relationship. For example, the rules concerning occupation fees 
have been unwavering in the requirement of a finding of fault. The rules concerning 
improvements and repairs focus on drawing an artificial and narrow distinction 
whether an expenditure made by an occupying co-owner has improved the value of 
the property or not and in respect of rents and profits, the rules find the same narrow 
distinction between rental payments received from third parties and income earned 
from labour. Ironically, an application of the rules following such a rigid framework 
may compromise a result that would otherwise have been fairer to both parties if the 
underlying co-ownership relationship was viewed holistically.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the development of the equitable accounting 
rules in Australia by identifying potential weaknesses in the rules, especially in 
addressing the issues that have come to light due to the changing context of co-
ownership arrangements. For example, Kourakis CJ in the recent South Australian 
case of W v D,
9
 explained that the rules were not designed to resolve disputes in the 
context of a domestic relationship breakdown, which is a relatively recent 
phenomenon brought about by, as one factor, the increasing ownership of land by 
women and by sale on the open market as opposed to acquisition through 
inheritance.
10
 
 
This paper will argue that there should be a reformulation of the framework under 
                                                             
9
 [2012] SASCFC 142. 
10
 [2012] SASCFC 142 at 39. 
6 
 
which co-ownership disputes are settled, so that the rules engage in a substantive 
enquiry of the co-ownership relationship viewed holistically as opposed to a formal 
one. In order to be effective, this framework must exhibit a unifying theme or guiding 
principle that is more specific than fairness but still sufficiently broad enough to allow 
courts to resolve disputes on a case-by-case basis. In developing this theme, this paper 
will consider the rules developed in the US, which differ in a number of respects to 
the Anglo-Australian approach. 
  
CHAPTER II - OCCUPATION FEES 
 
A Introduction - The Primary Rule 
 
The primary rule with respect to liability to pay occupation rent is that ‘a co-owner in 
sole occupation is not liable at law or in equity to pay an occupation rent to the non-
occupying co-owners.’11  The rule is premised on the touchstone principle of co-
ownership, that co-owners each have a right to possession of the whole property 
(subject to a similar right on the part of other co-owners) and that simply by 
exercising this right, it would be ‘unfair’ for a co-owner to be burdened by a claim for 
compensation at the suit of another co-owner who has failed to exercise their same 
right.
12
 The US rule is similar in effect, with an occupying co-owner not accountable 
to the absentee co-owner for use of the property since their occupancy was presumed 
                                                             
11
 Luke v Luke (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 310, 312. 
12
 Roger J. Smith, Plural ownership (Oxford University Press, 2005), 120. 
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to be their own right as the owner of one half of all and every part of the common 
property.
13
 The whole basis against making a co-owner in occupation liable to account 
is that if such liability were to exist, a co-owner could, by abstaining from entering 
into occupation, turn his co-owner into an involuntary bailiff.
14
 Non-occupation by a 
co-owner was thus presumed to be voluntary by the primary rule and virtually without 
remedy, unless one of three exceptions (agreement, ouster or a claim for 
improvements or lasting repairs) could be shown. 
  
B The First Exception: Agreement 
 
Firstly, if there is an agreement between the co-owners, the court treats one party as 
having constituted him or herself as a bailiff, in which ‘they would be liable in an 
action of account, like any other bailiff’.15 US courts have adopted the terminology of 
landlord and tenant by treating the occupying co-owner as a tenant who is accountable 
to the landlord for their occupation by way of rent.
16
 Evidence of either a written or 
verbal agreement is clearly the most concrete evidence to demonstrate the parties’ 
intentions to not follow the primary rule.
17
  
 
C The Second Exception: The ‘Ouster’ Exception 
                                                             
13 Wolley v Schrader, 116 Ill. 29, 39, 4 N.E. 658 [1886]. 
14 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 298 (Meagher JA). 
15 The term ‘bailiff’ is derived from the language of Statute of Anne (1705) 4 & 5 c16, where a co-owner could 
maintain an account against the other as bailiff. See Re Tolman’s Estate (1928) 23 Tas LR 29, 31; Rees v Rees 
[1931] SASR 78, 80-81. 
16 Davies v Skinner, 58 Wis. 638, 17 N.W. 427 (1883). 
17 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 298 (Meagher JA). 
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Secondly, if a co-owner could demonstrate that there was a wrongful exclusion or 
‘ouster’ by the other co-owners, the excluding co-owner will be liable in mesne 
profits.
18
 The concept of ‘ouster’ developed as an exception to the primary rule at 
common law on equitable lines of reasoning developed by the Court of Chancery
19
 
which have been subsequently adopted by the common law courts. A co-owner could 
not wrongfully exclude other co-owners from the property and thereby deny them 
their common law right to possession of the whole property without being liable for 
an occupation rent.
20
 The excluding co-owner is deemed to have committed the tort of 
trespass on the excluded co-owner’s right of occupation of the shared property.21 The 
exclusion that amounts to an ouster must be wrongful in the sense of a legal wrong. 
When referring to the concept of a ‘legal wrong’ in Luke v Luke,22 Long Innes J did 
not differentiate between a positive legal wrong (actual ouster), and the denial of a 
legal right (constructive ouster). However, in Biviano v Natoli,
23
 an occupying co-
owner who obtained an order for exclusive occupation or an AVO was held to do no 
legal wrong, even though the practical consequence of the AVO was to deny the legal 
rights of the other co-owner to occupy the shared property.
24
  
 
Earlier cases started with the ‘underlying assumption…that there is no good reason 
                                                             
18 Dunlop v Macedo (1891) 8 TLR 43. 
19 See for example, Luke v Luke (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 310. 
20 Peter Butt, Land law (Thomson Reuters, 2010), 239. 
21 Paroz v Paroz [2010] QSC 203 [33]-[36] (Peter Lyons J). 
22 (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 310. 
23 (1998) 43 NSWLR 695. 
24 Biviano v Natoli (1998) 43 NSWLR 695. 
9 
 
why the non-occupying co-owner should not take up occupation’25. To this end, the 
onus of establishing that the behavior of the occupying co-owner amounted to an 
ouster rested on the non-occupying co-owner.
26
 The prima facie position in the US is 
similarly that entry into the shared property is a permissive entry on behalf of all co-
tenants, with the onus on the co-owner claiming an occupation fee to disprove this.
27
 
Because the ouster concept takes its meaning from the common law, the types of 
behavior that constituted an ouster and recent changes will now be discussed.  
 
1 ‘Actual’ Ouster 
 
Under traditional principles, an actual ouster by the occupying co-owner involved a 
civil wrong, either a trespass to the person by assault or battery, or a physical 
obstruction which prevented the absent co-owner from exercising his right to occupy 
the property.
28
 This gave rise to what Galloway
29
 critically regards as a long line of 
limited cases which required ‘some element of the occupant excluding the other co-
owners or refusing to allow them to exercise their right to possession’ 30 . 
Unambiguous examples of actual ousters include if a co-owner leaves as a result of 
violence or threats of violence, proven for example, by threats of calling the police.
31
 
                                                             
25 Scapinello v Scapinello [1968] SASR 316, 320. 
26 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 223 (Meagher JA).  
27 Clymer’s Lessee v Dawkins, 1845, 3 How. 674, 689, 44 U.S. 674, 689, 11 L.Ed. 778; Virginia Coal & Iron Co. v. 
Hylton, 1913, 115 Va. 418, 424, 79 S.E. 337, 339. 
28 Jacobs v Seward (1872) LR 5 HL 464, 472-473. 
29 Kate Galloway, ‘Liability for occupation rent: ‘no fault ouster’ of a co-tenant’, Australian Property Law Journal, 
23. 
30 Alfred A. Heon, ‘The Liability of a Co-tenant to Other Co-tenants for Rents, Profits and use and Occupation’ 
(1959) 42 Marq Law Review 363, 375. 
31 Re Thurgood (1986) Q COnvR 54. 
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Physical obstructions include locking the means of access to the property with the 
intention of exclusion,
32
 or changing the locks to the property
33
. Conversely, no ouster 
was found to exist when there were merely feelings of animosity between the 
parties.
34
 The latter cases proceed on the assumption that the absent co-owners have 
abandoned the property ‘voluntarily’ and ‘chosen not to exercise their legal rights to 
occupy the land’.35 These concepts of implicit voluntariness and choice to not occupy 
the land have been the subject of much debate between commentators and judges,
36
 
with the result that there has been a gradual expansion from what was a narrow 
interpretation of the requirement of ouster being in an actual or physical sense. 
 
2 ‘Constructive’ Ouster 
 
A ‘constructive’ ouster’ captures situations in which an ouster is implied because 
shared occupation is no longer deemed to be possible as a result of the wrongful 
actions of the occupying co-owner.
37
 But they are not wrongful actions that amount to 
trespass or exclusion as above. For example, in Biviano v Natoli, the occupying co-
owner persisted in her denial of the respondent’s title, which amounted to an express 
denial of his rights and constituted an ouster.
38
 A more implicit denial will also suffice 
for the definition. For example, a co-owner’s exercise of the right to possession over 
                                                             
32 Jacobs v Seward(1872) LR 5 HL 464, 472 (Lord Hatherley LC). 
33 Ryan v Dries (2002) 10 BPR 19. 
34 Marriott v Franklin (1993) 60 SASR 457. 
35 Re Thurgood [1987] ANZ ConvR 44. 
36 See for example, the opposing dicta between Meagher J and Kirby P in Forgeard v Shanahan  (1994) 35 
NSWLR 206, 212.  
37 Chieco v Evans (1990) BC 900 2356 [6]. 
38 Biviano v Natoli (1998) 43 NSWLR 695, 703 (Powell JA, Beazley JA and Stein JA). 
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the whole of the land in a way which compromises the capacity of another co-owner 
to equally enjoy the land might constitute exclusion and amount to a trespass.
39
 In the 
Queensland case of Paroz v Paroz,
40
 one party, in breach of an interlocutory 
injunction, conducted grazing activities beyond the capacity of the shared farm and 
slashed grassland for the purpose of ploughing a substantial area of land without the 
consent of the other co-owners. The Queensland Court of Appeal found a constructive 
ouster on the basis that the conduct of the excluding co-owner had exceed their rights 
as co-owner of the land.
41
  
 
The case clearly represents a significant factual development from the original 
meaning of ouster as a denial of the right to physical occupation of the property. The 
trespass is no longer physical in the sense of an obstruction preventing entry; rather, it 
is a trespass on the rights of the other co-owners to enjoy the land. This reasoning 
clearly implies that co-owners have an obligation to respect each other’s rights and by 
not respecting such rights, a co-owner will be acting wrongfully and thus liable for an 
occupation fee. However, the crucial finding of fault on behalf of the excluding party 
means that the case is still consistent with the underlying reasoning of the trespass 
exception and the traditional approach of the rules, that is, a measure designed to 
punish the trespassing co-owners (more than to compensate the excluded co-owner).
42
 
Although not explicitly referred to in the case, the finding of ouster can also be 
                                                             
39 Paroz v Paroz [2010] QSC 203 [33]-[36] (Peter Lyons J). 
40 [2010] QCA 203. 
41 Paroz v Paroz [2010] QSC 203 [38] (Fraser and Chesterman JJA and Jones J) 
42 This is because a co-owner who is excluded by an AVO receives no occupation fee as no legal wrong has been 
committed. 
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framed as an enquiry into the reasonableness of the excluding party’s actions. A 
reasonable co-owner would not ignore an interlocutory injunction, nor use the 
property in a way that blatantly denies the other co-owner’s rights to use the same.  
 
The US cases extend the concept of constructive ouster to include ‘circumstances as 
to evince a claim of exclusive right and a denial of the right of the other (owner) to 
participate in the profits’43. For example, in Neubeck v Neubeck,44 there was no ouster 
where a wife left her husband and he continued to inhabit their previous marital abode. 
The husband was merely required to reimburse the wife for the rent taken in from the 
boarder the husband took on after the wife left. However, the unlawfulness of the 
excluding co-owner’s actions which has been the touchstone for the cases so far, 
appears to be losing relevance in light of the “relationship breakdown” cases, which 
will now be discussed. 
 
3 ‘No Fault’ Ouster 
 
There are essentially three possible scenarios during the course of the co-ownership 
relationship that is able to engage this area of the law. Up to this point, it has been 
established that no occupation fee is payable to a co-owner who departs the property 
voluntarily. Conversely, an occupation fee is payable by an occupying co-owner if 
they have ‘ousted’ the other. The third situation is the most difficult to explain and 
                                                             
43 Mastbaum v Mastbaum, 126 N.J. Eq. 366, 9 A.2d 51 (Ch.Ct. 1939). 
44 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 119 A.26. 
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justify, and concerns whether in the absence of wrongdoing, an occupying co-owner 
should pay an occupation fee where the co-ownership relationship has broken down 
due to general unpleasantness and in the absence of any wrongdoing on the part of 
either co-owner. Because there is no legal wrongdoing, the traditional approach would 
hold that no occupation fee is payable by the occupying co-owner.  
 
The problem with the traditional approach was, as Kirby P emphatically noted in his 
dissent in Forgeard v Shanahan,
45
 that it ignored the ‘multitude of reasons which may 
explain a withdrawal from land held in co-ownership after the breakdown of the 
personal relationship’46. His Honour was referring to the changing social trends giving 
rise to the high incidence in contemporary Australian society of home ownership, 
including co-ownership by women which was largely unknown a few centuries ago.
47
 
Another significant development has been the high levels of de facto married 
relationships, the high incidence of breakdown of such relationships and the 
subsequent necessity for the courts to adjust the claims of the parties.  
 
This doctrine is an independent ground for claiming an occupation fee and does not 
depend on the traditional requirements of an ouster. The doctrine took form with 
earlier decisions such as Dennis v McDonald,
48
 in which the court recognized that it 
was often ‘the breakdown in an association’ which causes one party, for practical 
                                                             
45 (1994) 35 NSWLR 206. 
46 Forgeard v Shanahan 18 Fam LR 281, 287. 
47 18 Fam LR 281, 285. 
48 [1982] Fam 63. 
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purposes, to be excluded from the family home.
49
 Although the context of the 
relationship breakdown was still one of violence and this was the basis of the court’s 
decision, the court conceded in obiter, that the underlying reason behind the wrongful 
exclusion was attributable to general unpleasantness beyond the violence viewed in 
isolation.
50
 However, the court was unwilling to deviate from the traditional approach 
by basing their finding of an ouster on reasons that went beyond the violence.
51
 
 
As a further development, the Court of Appeal in Callow v Rupchev
52
 found that there 
was ‘no need to identify violence or threat of violence to justify a finding that 
departure of the one co-tenant was involuntary’53. The Court agreed with Kirby P’s 
dissent in Forgeard v Shanahan
54
, which lamented the changes in society which 
required a reformulation of ‘old’ principles to recognize the reality behind the 
breakdown of relationships in the context of contemporary property ownership.
55
 This 
decision has given rise to an array cases where no violence or threatened violence 
could be found but which held that an occupation fee was payable by the co-owner in 
occupation.
56
  
 
In responding to cases of this nature, Kirby P’s recommendations that an occupation 
rent be payable in all cases where one co-owner has been in exclusive occupation of 
                                                             
49 Ibid, 71. 
50 Ibid, 70-71. 
51 Ibid. 
52 [2009] NSWCA 146. 
53 Ibid [30] 
54 Ibid [55] – [61]. 
55 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 211. 
56 See for example, Payne v Rowe [2012] NSWSC 685; W v D  [2012] SASCFC 142; Maio v Sacco [2009] 
NSWSC 413. 
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the land,
57
 has been heavily criticized by various commentators. For example, 
Brereton J
58
 argued that it offends the basic precept of co-ownership, being that co-
owners have an equal right to share in the occupation of the land. Indeed, as Long 
Innes CJ noted in Luke v Luke
59
, endorsing the comments of Kindersley VC in 
Griffies v Griffies
60
 and Salmond J in McCormick v McCormick,
61
 the imposition of a 
general occupation rent in the absence of an ouster or other circumstances giving rise 
to an occupation rent has not received notable support.
62
 Courts were wary of the 
injustice that would be suffered by a co-owner who is forced to assume sole 
responsibility of the land when their co-owner merely abandons the land and is further 
punished by being liable for an occupation fee.
63
 Instead, unreasonableness of 
continued occupation appears to be the factual enquiry that the courts must undertake. 
The Full Court in Callow v Rupchev
64
 approved the comments of Brereton J in McKay 
v McKay
65
 and held that: 
 
‘If it becomes no longer reasonable or practicably sensible to expect the partners 
to co-occupy the one property, the one who remains in possession may be taken to 
do so to the exclusion of the other, and to be liable to pay an occupation fee’66.  
 
                                                             
57 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 214. 
58Peter Butt, ‘The Rights Between Co-owners of Land’ (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal 316, 318. 
59 (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 310. 
60 (1863) 8 LT 758. 
61 (OH) 1994 SCLR 958. 
62 Luke v Luke (1936) 36 SR (NSW) 310, 315. 
63 Ibid. 
64 [2009] NSWCA 148, [59]. 
65 [2008] NSWSC 177 [51]. 
66 McKay v McKay [2008] NSWSC 177 [51] (Brereton J). 
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Butt P has suggested that the principle should not be limited to matrimonial or 
domestic relationships
67
 because the rationale is that the occupying co-owner cannot 
be liable for an occupation fee where the non-occupying co-owner is free to take up 
occupation but chooses not to.
68
 This has been confirmed in the NSW Supreme Court 
decision of Payne v Rowe & Anor,
69
 which held that an occupation fee was payable 
between a brother (Jeremy), sister (Jo) and mother (Helen) who shared the property in 
common but whose domestic relationship had broken down to the extent that the sister, 
Jo had to leave. The breakdown was the result of the parties’ differing expectations 
which made it intolerable for them to continue to live together.
70
 For example, Jo 
expected Jeremy to give her an interest in his business when she had provided 
considerable assistance in relation to the business, but he did not.
71
 Ball J concluded 
that Jo wasn’t excluded from the property but chose to leave because of the 
breakdown of her relationship with Jeremy.
72
 He focused instead, on the 
unreasonableness of expecting Jo to return to the property as the basis for the 
imposition of an occupation fee.
73
 
 
4 The Erosion of Well-Established Property Rights? 
 
It cannot be doubted that this ‘new principle’ acknowledges and is able to better 
                                                             
67 As in between de facto partners. 
68 Butt, Peter, Land law (Thomson Reuters, 2010), 240. [14.38.1]. 
69 [2012] NSWSC 685. 
70 Ibid, [92] (Ball J). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid [114]. 
73 Ibid [112]. 
17 
 
accommodate for the array of personal and circumstantial reasons that may give rise 
to the breakdown of a co-ownership relationship. Certainly, it is easier for a non-
occupying co-owner to bring a successful accounting action for occupation fees as 
there is no longer a requirement to establish wrongdoing on behalf of the occupying 
co-owner. In fact, it must be doubted whether the new doctrine requires any element 
of exclusion at all, because departure is more likely to be a choice for a co-owner in 
the face of general unpleasantness in a relationship, than if they were ousted by a 
blameworthy and trespassing co-owner. The difference between a departure that is 
forced and one that is a result of choice may become difficult to distinguish. It is 
doubtful whether this distinction needs to be proven at all, given that in McKay v 
McKay,
74
 the departure of one co-owner from the property was considered voluntarily, 
albeit in circumstances where it was desirable if not inevitable that one or other of the 
parties would do so.
75
 While the cases have held that an occupation fee is payable by 
the occupying co-owner in this context, there has been some reservations about the 
scope of this principle.
76
 If not properly confined, the ramifications of this expansion 
could mean that all a co-owner in occupation will be liable in all situations when a 
relationship breaks down. For example, Kourakis CJ is convinced that “treating all 
relationship breakdowns as constructive exclusions by reason of a legal fiction is not a 
satisfactory solution”77.  
 
                                                             
74 [2008] NSWSC 177. 
75 Ibid [53] (Brereton J). 
76
 See for example, the comments of Kourakis CJ in W v D [2012] SASCFC 142 [70]. 
77 Ibid. 
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5 A New Framework 
 
In order to propose a satisfactory framework to resolve these cases, it is helpful to 
consider the concept of ‘attributable blame’, which in the context of co-ownership has 
been described by Bryson J in Bennett v Horgan
78
 to have a broad meaning and ‘does 
not call for a judgment attributing blame among members of a family for the 
continuing relationship becoming intolerable’ 79 . With no elaboration on what 
constitutes intolerable, it appears the broad construction given to relationship 
breakdowns has reversed the traditional onus on the departing co-owner to establish 
exclusion by the occupying co-owner. Instead, it is arguable that the prima facie 
position now appears to be in favour of an occupation fee, with the onus on the 
occupying co-owner to argue that it was reasonable for the non-occupying co-owner 
to return and that they were not merely ‘voluntarily abstinent’80. However, to date, 
there have been no cases in which an argument has been advanced as to the 
reasonableness of return to the property. The New South Wales Supreme Court has 
recently expressed concerns regarding the intricacies of the options available to co-
owners upon the breakdown of a relationship in Barel v Segal
81
:  
 
‘The plaintiff is not in occupation to the exclusion of the defendant. The defendant 
has been free to come and go as he pleases ... it cannot matter that the defendant is 
                                                             
78 Bennett v Horgan Unreported, NSWSC, 3 June 1994 
79 Ibid, [11]. 
80 Kate Galloway, ‘Liability for occupation rent: ‘No fault ouster’ of a co-tenant’ (2010) 19 APLJ 23, 27. 
81 [2012] NSWSC 1054. 
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understandably not welcome in the home. The defendant has expressed no desire 
to enter the house, or has any reason for doing so. There is no injustice and no 
occasion or need to require the plaintiff to pay an occupation fee to prevent 
injustice to the defendant’.82 
 
Galloway notes this development as introducing an ‘interesting element’ which 
arguably represents a shift in the approach of the courts to the nature and right of 
possession and remedies for interference.
83
 In this regard, she is referring to the 
diminished importance placed on the interference in the right of possession as the 
basis for the imposition of an occupation fee, because there is a conscious decision to 
depart the property that can be ascribed to the departing co-owner. In this regard, the 
purpose of the award is clearly compensatory on the absentee co-owner and not 
punitive on the occupying co-owner. 
 
At this point, it seems appropriate to reflect on the value that can be attributed to the 
traditional rules as identified by Meagher J in Forgeard v Shanahan
84
. Although the 
stringent requirement of finding fault in the actions of the remaining co-owner may 
have precluded some accounting claims, the rules were sourced from well-entrenched, 
albeit limited property rights that set a clear boundary on the rights and liabilities of 
co-owners. On one hand, it can be said they were deficient in responding to the reality 
of relationship breakdowns, but on the other, they presented a clear basis on which to 
                                                             
82 Barel v Segal [2012] NSWSC 1054 [28] (Pembroke J). 
83 Galloway, above 80, 25. 
84 (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 221-222. 
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impose an occupation fee.  
 
The premise of the discussion so far has been the association of a liability to pay an 
occupation fee with fault. In light of the incongruence of fault with the new line of 
relationship breakdown cases, it may be helpful to consider the basis of liability to 
pay occupation fee from a different perspective. This basis, for example, can be an 
enquiry into the reasonableness of a co-owner’s actions in respecting fellow co-
owners and the co-ownership relationship. This proposed basis would not change the 
traditional rules regarding ouster as it would be unreasonable for an occupying co-
owner to actually or constructively exclude their fellow co-owner from the shared 
property.  
 
In the context of a relationship breakdown however, the proposed basis gives the rules 
more consistency and shifts the focus away from the stringent fault requirement so as 
give courts sufficient discretion to consider the co-ownership relationship holistically. 
For example, the courts role would be to enquire into whether the circumstances of 
the relationship breakdown were such that a reasonable co-owner in the position of 
the absentee co-owner would have departed the property, or whether the departure 
was mutually agreed, either expressly or implicitly. In other words, the enquiry is into 
whether a reasonable co-owner would have treated the co-ownership relationship as 
coming to an end. If the absentee co-owner’s departure is reasonable, then it is also 
reasonable to expect an occupying co-owner to compensate their fellow co-owner for 
21 
 
this mutually agreed departure by way of an occupation fee. In this regard, the 
purpose of the award is purely compensatory on the absentee co-owner who has to 
find alternative accommodation. However, if the court finds that the departure is not 
consistent with the rights and obligations imposed by the co-ownership relationship, 
no occupation fee should be awarded. For example, in the case of Barel v Segal,
85
 no 
occupation fee would be awarded as there was no definitive evidence that suggested 
the parties had treated the co-ownership relationship as having ended. 
 
The benefit of this proposed framework is its ability to give effect to the implied 
intention of co-owners. In this regard, it is important to view the co-ownership 
relationship as an agreement where upon entry, co-owners impliedly subscribe to 
respect each others’ property rights and to jointly honour the shared obligations that 
arise from the property. Where the property is inherited and the co-owners choose to 
continue the relationship, an implicit acceptance of and agreement arises between the 
co-owners to respect the co-ownership relationship. The proposed framework reflects 
this agreement in the sense that a co-owner who deviates from their agreement may 
not recoup their full share of the proceeds of the property as they would otherwise be 
entitled. Although co-owners do not have fiduciary obligations to fellow co-owners,
86
 
there should be a standard of behavior that can be reasonably expected from a party to 
a co-ownership relationship which would forms the benchmark of the proposed 
framework under which the behavior of litigating co-owners is assessed. 
                                                             
85
 [2012] NSWSC 1054. 
86 Kennedy v De Trafford [1897] AC 180, 186. 
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5 United States Position 
 
The US has not recognized relationship breakdowns as an independent ground for 
charging an occupation fee. The absentee co-owner must still demonstrate that acts by 
the occupying co-owner ‘were openly adverse to the concept of co-(ownership)’87 i.e. 
an actual or constructive exclusion. For example, in Reitmeier v Kalinoski,
88
 the mere 
fact Ms Kalinoski (the absentee co-owner) did not wish to live with Mr Reitmeier (the 
occupying co-owner) was of no import. What the courts considered was whether she 
could physically live on the premises. However, there is no injustice done to the 
absentee co-owner because as will be seen in Chapter III, the US approach is to award 
occupying co-owners with a credit for necessary outgoings they have incurred to 
preserve the value of the property. In most of the “relationship breakdown” cases, 
while not all occupying co-owners will make improvements, they will bear the burden 
of making necessary expenditures e.g. taxes, insurance costs. A claim for necessary 
expenditures brought by an occupying co-owner entitles the absentee co-owner to 
bring a claim for occupation fees.
89
 If able to be adopted in Australia, the US 
approach represents an alternative to the framework suggested above, but requires a 
reformulation of the rules regarding improvements and repairs. 
 
D Quantum of Occupation Fee 
                                                             
87 Baird v Moore, 50 N.J. Super. 156, 141A.2d 324 (App. Div. 1958). 
88 631 F. Supp. 565. 
89 Ibid. 
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The measure of an occupation fee has not been approached consistently by both 
Australian and English courts. The differences can be attributed to the range of 
purposes the award is designed to achieve given the factual background of the cases. 
This is especially true in light of the broader interpretation given to an ‘ouster’ as an 
independent ground of claiming an occupation fee in the context of a relationship 
breakdown.  
 
Earlier cases
90
 have held an occupation rent to be payable on the basis of the wrongful 
denial of title, upon which it would be appropriate to quantify the fee as a 
proportionate percentage of the market rent of the home. For example, if there are two 
co-owners and one has been ousted, a fee of 50% of the market rent would supposedly 
recompense the excluded co-owner for their lost opportunity to occupation of the 
shared property. Such was the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal of NSW in 
Biviano v Natoli,
91
 notwithstanding the concession suggested by Beazley JA in obiter, 
that the market rent was not the appropriate measure of a fee because a stranger 
renting the home would have to share it with the occupying co-owner.
92
 Subsequent 
cases such as McKay v McKay
93
 have accepted half the market rent for the period of 
exclusion as the proper measure of an occupation fee, with no allowance for interest 
as the value is in ‘today’s values’ and no need to consider inflation. 94 A real estate 
                                                             
90 See for example, Biviano v Natoli (1998) 43 NSWLR 695, 704. 
91 (1998) 43 NSWLR 695 
92 Ibid, 704. 
93 [2008] NSWSC 177, [54] 
94 Ibid. 
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agent or valuer’s evidence must be relied upon to determine the value of the rent 
during the period of exclusion.
95
 However, the position is far from settled and the 
confusing state of authorities was captured in the following submission of the 
respondent in Biviano
96
: 
 
‘In French v Barcham,97 the amount was assessed at ‘one half of the letting value. 
In Dennis v McDonald,
98
 the amount was assessed at ‘one half of a fair rent’. In 
Bernard v Josephs,
99
 the amount was to be worked out by reference to mortgage 
payments’. 
 
The financial ramifications of the different measurements and their alignment with the 
purpose of finding an ouster are important considerations so as to ensure the 
measurements are able to account for the co-ownership relationship holistically. It 
appears that the courts have been afforded some discretion in quantifying the measure 
of an occupation fee in order to fairly account between the parties. In Dennis v 
McDonald,
100
 the basis of calculation was the full market rent, but this was too high 
due to the property’s scarcity in the market. A fairer value would have been the value 
of the rent in an unfurnished state.  
 
Furthermore, the timing of the award of occupation fee is when the property is sold 
                                                             
95 Heather Conway, Partition Actions and Accounting – Adjustments between co-owners (1999) 7 APLJ 207, 212 
96 Outline of Submissions of the respondent at 30. 
97 [2009] 1 WLR 1124. 
98 (1982) 2 WLR 275. 
99 [1982] 43 NSWLR 695. 
100  [1982] Fam 63. 
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and partitioned, but its value is with reference to the relevant period of exclusion. In 
the interests of fairness to the occupying co-owner, Beazley JA proposed as an 
alternative in Biviano v Natoli, mesne profits (damages awarded for trespass), 
calculated
101
 by reference to the open market and not rent.
102
 This value would be 
discounted to take into account that a lessee must share the property with the co-
owner who remains in occupation. Kourakis CJ in the subsequent South Australian 
case of W v D,
103
 in obiter, accepts this lower rental value attributable to the obligation 
to share the property with another, but only if the appropriate measure is the lost 
opportunity to lease the joint interest in the land.
104
 Hence, this is not appropriate in 
the context of a relationship breakdown because the purpose of the award is to 
compensate the absentee co-owner for the cost of seeking alternative accommodation. 
In this context, Kourakis CJ expressed his preference for the measure to be the cost of 
obtaining alternative accommodation which reasonably replaces the standard of 
accommodation lost, as a measure that ‘more closely compensates the excluded 
owner’105. 
 
The US cases have preferred to hold the remaining co-tenant liable for all charges 
assessable against the property as well as owing the ousted co-owner one half of the 
                                                             
101 The calculation would involve a valuation by a real estate agent or valuer as to how much the property would 
be worth if sold in the open market. 
102 At 704A citing Progressive Mailing House Pty Ltd v Tabali Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 17, 39; Rock Bottom 
Fashion Market Pty Ltd (In Liq) v HR & CE Griffiths Pty Ltd (unreported, Court of Appeal Queensland, 6 March 
1998, 10-12 (Dowsett J); Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246, 
252 (Somervell LJ). 
103 [2012] SASCFC 142. 
104 Ibid, [50] 
105 Ibid. 
26 
 
reasonable rental value of the property (assuming 50% ownership each).
106
 The term 
‘reasonable’ effectively affords the court a wide discretion in determining the measure 
in the context of each individual case. With respect to judicial discretion, the US 
approach is not so different from the Anglo-Australian one. 
 
 
CHAPTER III - IMPROVEMENTS AND REPAIRS 
 
A Introduction – The Primary Rule 
 
A claim for an allowance for improvements made to the property by an occupying co-
owner is the third exception to the primary rule against occupation fees. Equity will 
permit such an allowance only on terms that the occupying co-owner is accountable 
for an occupation fee. At common law, co-ownership and the entitlement to use and 
occupy the entire property alone did not carry with it, an obligation on the part of a 
co-owner to contribute to the cost of an improvement of the land undertaken by 
another co-owner.
107
 An exception arose if the co-owners contract as to the basis on 
which improvements will be paid for and used.
108
 The Court of Chancery took a more 
equitable approach, by allowing an occupying co-owner who had paid for an 
improvement to bring the costs of the improvement into account if it has enhanced the 
                                                             
106 C.Y., 16 Misc. 3d 1102 [1], 2007 WL 1775506. 
107 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 223-224; Teasdale v Saunderson (1864) 33 Beav 534; 55 ER 
476, 478. 
108 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60, 65. 
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value of the land on partition or sale of the property.
109
  
 
B Improvement or Repair? 
 
The basic principle draws a distinction between activities that are improvements or 
repairs. Improvements are generally understood as expenditures that increase the 
value of the property, while expenditures in the nature of repairs and maintenance do 
not.
110
 For example, the construction of a pergola in the garden is an improvement.
111
 
The provision of a new side fence,
112
 painting the original house and landscaping,
113
 
mowing lawns, general gardening work, general maintenance jobs, replacing taps and 
hoses, replacing sewer pipes, clearing tree roots, and washing and painting walls and 
ceiling
114
 are not improvements. However, the antithesis drawn between 
improvements and repairs is deceptive in the sense that if a repair increases the value 
of the property, it will be treated analogously to improvements and the improving co-
owner is entitled to an allowance for such repairs.
115
 Although the same distinction in 
terminology is found in the US, the meanings given to the terms are very different. 
For example, repairs are framed as ‘expenditures necessary to protect or preserve the 
property’,116 without reference to whether the expenditures increase the capital value 
                                                             
109 In NSW, co-owners have a right to contribution in equity arising on the sale of a property following the 
appointment of trustees for sale pursuant to s66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 or where the property is resumed. 
See Leigh v Dickeson [1884] 15 QBD 60, 65 - 67; Forgeard v Shanahan 1994 35 NSWLR 206. 
110 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 224 (Meagher JA). 
111 Senno v Bailey [2011] NSWSC 679, [38] (Macready ASJ). 
112 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206 , 298 (Meagher JA). 
113 McKay v McKay [2008] NSWSC 177 [44] (Brereton J). 
114 Ibid. 
115 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60 at 67. Re-stated by Hodgson JA in Ryan v Dries (2002) 10 BPR 19, 497. 
Cf Meagher JA in Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 224. 
116 Worthing, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 923. 
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of the property. Improvements will not be allowed if they are not in the nature of 
repairs or restoration and are made for the occupying co-owner’s own purposes 
without the agreement or consent of the other co-owners.
117
  
 
C Express or Implied Request 
 
If the expenditures do not increase the value of the property, the occupying co-owner 
may still seek relief if there is an express contract to contribute, or if the expenditure 
is made on behalf of both owners at the express or implied request of the other co-
owner.
118
 This principle is clearly consistent with the communication and respect 
between co-owners that is at the crux of the co-ownership relationship. There is no 
difficulty in implying a request when expenditures are made to discharge a debt or 
liability for or to which both co-owners are subject.
119
 The more controversial 
position is that a request would not be implied from the fact that the property would 
fall into dilapidation if the expenditure were not made, or from the fact that the non-
occupying co-owner showed no interest in the maintenance of the property. 
 
D ‘Enhanced Value’ Rule 
 
The guiding principle for courts exercising equitable jurisdiction is that a division of 
proceeds of the property ‘must have regard to any increase in its value which has been 
                                                             
117 Grishaver v Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 924, 933-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961). 
118 Batard v Hawes [1853] 118 ER 775, 296. 
119 Dimes v Arden (1836) 6 N&M 494; Leigh v Dickeson [1884] 15 QBD 60, 68 – 69. 
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brought about by means of expenditure by one (co-owner)’120. This equitable rule has 
influenced common law cases, with Cotton LJ explaining its rationale in Leigh v 
Dickeson,
121
 that it would be ‘unconscionable for a co-owner, who has not expended 
money on an improvement, to insist on the full measure of his or her rights in law to 
the enhanced proceeds of the improved land without accounting for a proper share of 
the costs of achieving that higher value.
122
 Furthermore, reimbursement is only 
allowed for the lower of the amount expended and the amount by which the value of 
the property has been increased.
123
 This limitation is justified by equitable reasoning; 
that the non-improving co-owner only has to reimburse the claimant insofar as he or 
she has benefited from the work.
124
 
  
This can be contrasted to the US position, where on partition and with respect to 
improvements, US courts have held the occupying co-owner has no right to be 
reimbursed for any improvements which he has made, on the ground that this would 
constitute imposing liability upon his co-owner without his consent. Consent can be 
express, in the form of a written or oral agreement, or implied, as in an understanding 
that may be reasonably inferred from the conduct and declarations of the co-
owners.
125
 As an example, in Ashley v Chinen,
126
 the Californian Court of Appeal 
concluded that when Chinen (the absentee co-owner) moved out, evidence supported 
                                                             
120 Re Pavlou [1993] 1 WLR 1046, 1050. 
121 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60, 67. 
122 Biviano v Natoli; Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206. 
123 Teasdale v Sanderson [1864] EngR 349; (1864) 33 Beav 534, 55 ER 476. 
124 Farrington v Forrester [1893] 2 Ch. 461, 463. 
125 Kershman v Kershman, supra, 192 Cal. App. 2d, 26. 
126 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2306. 
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the reasonable inference that he allowed Ashley (the occupying co-owner) to 
exclusively possess and reside at the property without paying rent provided all the 
property’s expenses, including mortgage installments.127  
 
The US approach appears to ignore the financial benefit derived by a non-improving 
co-owner from the increase to the value of the property brought about by the 
improvements in partition or sale proceedings as equity’s reason for recognizing a 
claim for improvements. In this regard, perhaps the approach will not be able to 
achieve the financially fair outcome as currently understood by Australian and 
English rules. For example, under the US rules, the outcome of Ryan v Dries would 
be the same as the case held that an allowance should be made for repairs regardless 
of whether they increase the value of the property.
128
 In Forgeard v Shanahan, the 
outcome would be the approach suggested by Kirby P who allowed the occupying co-
owner an allowance for expenditure on necessary payments such as water rates, pest 
control, council rates. The issue of consent was not discussed in the case. However, 
the outcome of Squire v Rogers would be different. No allowance would be made for 
the cost of improvements effected as the improving co-owner did not seek the consent 
of the other. But considered from another perspective, the result is fair in the sense 
that co-owners who improve the property without the consent of others are seen to 
infringe upon the absent co-owners’ property rights and are thereby unable to seek 
compensation. This result would encourage the mutual collaboration of co-owners 
                                                             
127 Ashley v Chinen, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2306, 20 (McDonald J). 
128Ryan v Dries (2002) 10 BPR 19, 497, 502. 
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and thereby ensure that each co-owner’s respective property rights are respected by 
the others. 
 
E ‘Necessary’ Expenditures 
 
The enhanced value rule does not appreciate that some expenditures are necessarily 
incurred to preserve and protect the property in order to prevent the decline in its 
value. Such expenditures include insurance premiums, taxes, pest control, re-painting, 
water and council rates. A occupying co-owner who incurs these costs has 
traditionally been held to have no remedy by way of a proportionate contribution by 
fellow co-owners on the basis that they do not improve the underlying value of the 
property.
129
 However, this principle appears to offend the primary rule regarding 
occupation fees. That is, by voluntarily abstaining from occupation of the shared 
property, a departing co-owner could force the remaining co-owner to become an 
involuntary bailiff. These expenditures arise as part of the general obligations of any 
owners of real property and a co-owner should not be able to escape these obligations 
by simply by departing the property.  
 
In contrast, the position in the US is different. With respect to repairs, it has long been 
established in the US, on principles of ‘good conscience,’130 that the duty and burden 
of repairing the property, including paying taxes and interest on the mortgage 
                                                             
129 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60, 65.; McMahon v Public Curator (Qld) [1952] QSR 197, 198. 
130 Stewart v Stewart, 90 Wis. 516, 63 N.W. 886 (1895). 
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devolves equally upon all co-owners.
131
 This rule applies regardless of the fact that 
only one tenant may be in actual possession of the property because such expenditures 
protect the property from loss or damage and thus all cotenants benefit.
132
 But where 
one co-owner is in fact, in sole possession, there is a presumption at law that he or she 
incurred the outgoings at the request of the others and for their benefit as a joint 
owner of the property,
133
 and a promise to reimburse will be implied.
134
 
Reimbursement will only be warranted however, if the expenditures ‘were made in 
good faith and were necessary to protect or preserve the property’.135 In this regard, 
the claimant must prove the circumstances and need for the restoration work. For 
example, in Newman v Chase,
136
  the absentee co-owner was ordered to contribute to 
mortgage payments (both principal and interest), homeowners insurance, taxes, fire 
insurance, and municipal utility assessments. While contribution for the sewage bill 
was granted because it was owed to a municipally owned utility company which 
could establish a lien on the property, the water bill was not as it was owed to a 
private utility. 
 
The US approach further diverges from its English and Australian counterparts by 
entrusting a heavier responsibility to the co-owner who is in sole possession on the 
basis they are considered the agent of the others.
137
 Not only are they authorized to do 
                                                             
131 Willmon v Koyer, 168 Cal. 369, 143 Pac. 694 (1914). 
132 Gilmore v Gilmore, 28 III. App. 3d 36, 40 (1975); Moniuszko v Moniuszko, 238 III.App.3d 523, 531 (1992) 
133 Kites v Church, 142 Mass. 586, 8 N.E. 743 (1886). 
134 Fowler v Fowler, 50 Conn. 256 (1882). 
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136 70 N.J. 254, 359 A. 2d 474 (1976).  
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that which is necessary to preserve the estate, but they are under a duty to do so.
138
 
This would include seeking reasonable tax advice to minimise expenditure on taxes 
during the whole occupancy, paying the mortgage installments and insurance.
139
 
When such duties are discharged, the occupying co-owner becomes subrogated to an 
equitable lien to secure contribution from the absent co-owner.
140
 The onerous 
obligations imposed on the occupying co-owner is further negated by the greater 
rights they are afforded. Not only do they have the right to contribution in an 
independent suit,
 141
 that is, one not dependent on the increase to the value to the 
property or on the other co-owners’ claim for an occupation fee, this right extends as 
far as being able to compel the noncontributing coowner to abandon his share of the 
property as an alternative to compensation.
142
  
 
1. Pest Control, Maintenance and Repairs, Re-painting, Insurance Payments, 
Council and Water Rates 
 
Meagher JA held in Forgeard,
143
 that maintenance and repairs (in the form of 
provision of a new side fence), insurance premiums, pest control were not 
improvements for the purpose of the enhanced rule because they were not permanent 
and additional improvements to the land. Professor Butt also agrees that no allowance 
should be made for expenditure for ordinary maintenance, such as periodical painting 
                                                             
138 Ibid. 
139 Dubois v Campau, 24 Mich.360 (1872). 
140 Connell v Welch, 101 Wis. 8, 76 N.W. 596 (1898); Hogan v McMahon, 115 Md. 195, 80 Atl. 695 (1911). 
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142 Duson v Roos, 123 La. 835, 49 So. 590 (1909). 
143 (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 209. 
34 
 
or pest spraying because ‘the value of the expenditure is exhausted each time it is 
renewed’.144 But this interpretation ignores the reality of the decline in value to the 
property and the subsequent detriment to both co-owners which would occur if such 
expenditures were not made. It is for this reason that Hodgson JA in Ryan v Dries 
disagreed
145
 with the reasoning of Meagher JA, preferred the reasoning of Kirby P in 
Forgeard, and held that the occupying co-owner was entitled to an allowance for 
repairs and not just additional or new improvements which increased the value of the 
property. Rein J in Ryan v Dries, was also of the opinion that in the absence of an 
express agreement, a co-owner ‘cannot leave the whole burden of repaying the loan 
obtained to purchase the property and other ongoing necessary expenditures such as 
council rates and insurance to the other co-owner without eroding his beneficial 
interest in the property’146. In this regard, the Australian approach appears to be 
moving towards that of the US. 
 
2 Cosmetic ‘Repairs’ 
 
However, the expenditures to be claimed must actually be ‘necessary to protect or 
preserve the property’.147 Following the US line of reasoning if they were made for 
‘personal convenience and enjoyment of the property’, any claim by the tenant in 
possession for reimbursement will be disallowed.
148
 For example, in the case of 
                                                             
144 Peter Butt, Land law (Thomson Reuters, 2010), 235. 
145 Ryan v Dries (2002) 10 BPR 19 [70]-[71]. 
146 Ly v Ly [2012] NSWSC 643 [19]. 
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Melnick v Press,
149
 expenditures disallowed included replacement of the living room 
floor, renovation of the kitchen counter and repairing cracks on the sidewalk (which 
were functional and not dangerous). These expenditures were described as ‘cosmetic 
repairs or repairs intended to fix minor problems with the property’150. Furthermore, 
in Palanza v Lufkin,
151
 the court found that the purchase of a wood stove was not a 
necessary expenditure.
152
 Although this outcome may appear to be harsh on the 
occupying co-owner, it must not be forgotten that they are enjoying the benefits of 
sole occupation of the property without having to account by way of an occupation 
fee (assuming voluntary departure of the absentee co-owner). Occupying co-owners 
should be compensated for payments necessary for retaining their ongoing and sole 
use of the property because the occupying co-owner is able to discharge their 
obligations to the property by retaining its value, while respecting the co-ownership 
relationship by ensuring the other co-owner has a home to come back to. 
 
3 Mortgage Payments 
 
It is settled by cases such as Ryan v Dries and Callow v Rupchev, that once an 
occupier is required to do equity because he or she is seeking equity, there is no 
reason to distinguish mortgage payments and improvements or repairs made to the 
property. However, there is inconsistent treatment of whether the amount is just the 
                                                             
149 809 F. Supp. 2d 43 (E.D. N.Y. 2011). 
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capital element of the installments or whether interest should be included. Millett J 
opined that repayment of only the capital element (and not the interest) of each 
mortgage installment increases the value of the equity of redemption which inures to 
the benefit of both joint tenants.
153
 
 
The US position offers an alternate view and prefers to treat mortgage payments as a 
necessary expenditure rather than an improvement. The reasoning is twofold; firstly, 
the payment of mortgage installments by the occupying co-owner does not increase 
that co-owner’s interest in the property.154 However, to the extent the occupying co-
owner has made payments beyond his or her share, he or she stands in the shoes of the 
creditor to whom the payments have been made.
155
 Therefore, the occupying co-
owner who pays obligations such as mortgage payments, taxes, liens and repairs is 
entitled to credit from the proceeds of sale for their proportionate share of those 
obligations.
156
  In this regard, both payment of principal and interest is necessary to 
prevent default and therefore inured to the benefit of all co-owners, thereby entitling 
the paying co-owner to reimbursement for both elements.  
 
4 Miscellaneous Expenditures  
 
It is not often clear the value that expenditures add to the property. For example in 
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earlier mentioned case of Payne v Rowe & Anor, Jeremy spent a substantial amount of 
money to construct a helipad on the occupyingial property Another example in the 
case is the construction of driveways and retaining walls and pillars at the entrance to 
the property. Ball J considered that the costs of these improvements were 
disproportionately large compared to the increase in value that has resulted from it, 
and he seriously questioned whether any value had been added at all.
157
 In the absence 
of the other co-owners’ consent, it is even arguable that the expenditures have 
detracted from the utility of occupation of the shared property. The conclusion of Ball 
J was for Jeremy and Jo to be ‘entitled to the value of the improvements that each has 
made to the property…’.158 
 
It appears that the decision deviates from the traditional approach by holding that co-
owners can be entitled to the sale proceeds of the property attributable to the 
improvements that each has made to the property. This approach would not infringe 
the primary rule as it would not be unconscionable for a co-owner to take the 
proceeds of the sale price that is the result of the work they have done. Similarly, there 
would be no need to account for the expenditures that they have incurred.  
 
F Offsets 
 
1 Offsetting Expenditures with Occupation Fee 
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Assuming that a value is ascertained for the amount of improvements or repairs, the 
next issue is offsetting a claim for occupation fees by the occupying co-owner. A 
claim for improvements is an exception to the primary rule regarding occupation fees 
whilst simultaneously, the claim for an occupation fee is spoken of as a ‘passive’ or 
‘defensive’ equity, that is, one able to repel a claim for improvements.159 Each claim is 
a potential incident of a partition or sale action and in this context, Master 
McLaughlin observed that the ‘no rent if no improvements’ doctrine makes good 
sense. This principle however, should be extended to include necessary outgoings 
incurred to derive rental income, a topic of discussion in chapter III. 
 
It should be noted that the offsetting occupation fee cannot exceed the claim for 
improvements because this would place the occupying co-owner who improves the 
land at a disadvantage relative to a co-owner who enjoys the whole of the land in the 
absence of his or her co-owner and does not improve the land.
160
 In the context of a 
relationship breakdown where the occupying co-owner has not infringed the rights of 
the departing co-owner, it appears that the rights and obligations derived from the 
rules favour of the absentee co-owner. In essence, the absentee co-owner is able to 
claim an occupation fee as compensation for non-occupation while the remaining co-
owner takes the initiative to work on the property and is unable to derive any financial 
benefit for doing so, on the presumption that the occupation fee will offset any claim 
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made by the occupying co-owner. Perhaps a more favourable approach would be to 
allow the offsetting occupation fee to exceed the claim for improvements only if there 
is fault that can be attributed to the occupying co-owner. This of course, would not 
apply to cases of relationship breakdowns. 
 
2 Off-setting Mortgage Payments with Occupation Fee 
 
Many cases have simply set off the interest element of the mortgage against an 
occupation fee, which Vinelott J pointed out in In re Gorman (A Bankrupt),
161
 was 
‘more a rule of convenience than between a spouse and a trustee in bankruptcy of the 
other co-owner‘. Further considerations must be given to whether the capital share of 
the occupying co-owner should be charged with an occupation if it exceeded 
mortgage payments made to the property. As with the claim for improvements, it 
would be equally as unconscionable for a occupying co-owner to claim a contribution 
to repayments of a joint loan without bringing to account the benefit he or she has 
received from remaining in occupation of the residence. However, while the occupyig 
co-owner is left with the benefit of sole occupation, they are also burdened with 
meeting joint liabilities to which the departing co-owner presumably no longer 
contributes. Of course, no issue arises if contributions continue to be made. In 
accounting for this burden on the remaining co-owner, Callow v Rupchev, following 
the majority decision in Forgeard v Shanahan, held that occupation rent should not 
                                                             
161 [1990] 1 WLR 616, 626. 
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exceed the contribution claimed for mortgage payments.
162
 If it did, the occupying co-
owner would be in a financially worse position than the departing co-owner even 
though they met the joint obligations of the property during the period. 
 
On the flip side, an absentee co-owner is not entitled to bring to account the benefit of 
the continuing occupation enjoyed by the occupying co-owner if the latter fails to 
make any mortgage repayments.
163
 In failing to meet the liability, the occupying co-
owner obviously is not able to enjoy the benefit of occupation as the mortgagee would 
be likely to assert a charge over the property. The only remedy of the occupying co-
owner would be to bring and prosecute a partition or sale application expeditiously.
164
 
 
In quantifying the off-setting occupation fee when contribution for mortgage 
payments is sought, Kourakis CJ opined that no discount should be allowed for the 
burden of the occupancy being a joint one.
165
 This refers to the discount of the rental 
value payable by a third party who rents the property because they would have to 
share it with the occupying co-owner, as discussed in chapter II. If a discount is 
allowed, the occupying co-owner will be financially worse off than if no discount was 
allowed. The rental value should not be discounted because the occupying co-owner 
who continues to pay the mortgage does so in order to enjoy the occupation of the 
entire property in the knowledge that the breakdown of the domestic relationship 
                                                             
162 Callow v Rupchev [2009] NSWCA 148 [73]. 
163 W v D [2012] SASCFC 142 [76]. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid [79]. 
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makes it unlikely that he or she will again be bound to share it with his or her former 
partner. 
 
G Reconciliation with Rights and Obligations of Co-ownership 
 
In determining whether improvements and repairs should be accounted for, the most 
important consideration should be the underlying property rights and responsibilities 
of co-ownership. In the context of improvements, this would include the right and 
responsibility of co-owners to mutually collaborate in deciding what to do with the 
property. In so far as the purpose of the rules are to protect property rights, they are 
not so different from the trespass exception; a co-owner who does not seek the 
permission of others and makes changes to the property can be said to trespass on the 
interests of the other co-owners who have an equal right to decide on whether 
improvements should be made to the property. The only difference is the financial 
gain potentially derived by the non-improving co-owner on partition or sale, which 
justifies the non-collaboration.  
 
In giving effect to the mutual respect that co-owners should have towards each others’ 
property rights, an improving co-owner should only be allowed a credit for 
improvements if a reasonable effort was made to seek the consent of the other co-
owners. This is consistent with the emphasis of the US approach on implying a 
promise to share the expenses before any relief can be awarded to the improving co-
42 
 
owner. In implying consent, while mere silence will not suffice, the good faith of the 
co-owners will be enquired into. For example, equity will go to great lengths to give 
relief where cotenants have knowledge about the improvements being made but 
choose not to respond to the improving co-owners who seek their consent to them.
166
 
 
H Conclusion 
 
The distinction between improvements and repairs appears often arbitrary with little 
utility, especially in respect of repairs that are necessary in preserving the value of the 
property or preventing its decline. The US position should be adopted in respect of 
repairs so that joint tenants are equally liable for the cost of necessary repairs because 
such expenditures are incurred to protect the property from loss or damage with the 
result that all co-owners benefit.
167
 With respect to improvements, it must first be 
enquired whether the co-owner in occupation made reasonable enquiries to seek the 
consent of the other co-owners before incurring large outgoings to effect 
improvements. This act would be consistent with the respect that co-owners have to 
one another to seek agreement on expenditures related to the property.  
 
It is equally necessary to enquire as to the reasonableness of the absentee co-owners’ 
response. For example, if they knowingly and deliberately do not respond and 
improvements are made, the absentee co-owners should be ordered to contribute to a 
                                                             
166 Crest v Jack, 3 Watts (Pa.) 238 (1834). 
167 Gilmore v Gilmore, 28 III. App. 3d 36, 40 (1975) and Moniuszko v Moniuszko, 238 III.App.3d 523, 531 (1992). 
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proportion of the costs of such improvements. However, if they are unable to be 
contacted, the next enquiry should be whether the improvements are made reasonably, 
that is, whether the costs of the improvements are proportionate to the increase to the 
value of the property. If they are not and the improvements are made unreasonably e.g. 
the construction of a helipad in circumstances where the utility of such an 
improvement is seriously questionable, no contribution should be payable by the 
absentee co-owners. This would change the approach of Ball J in Payne v Rowe. If 
however, the expenditures were incurred reasonably and the value to the property has 
increased by more than the expenditure, the absentee co-owners should be made to 
contribute to the costs of the improvements. 
 
The proposed amendments to the framework requires a more detailed investigation 
into the factual circumstances during the co-ownership relationship and the 
reasonableness of the co-owners’ behaviour during the term of the relationship. In 
some respects, this is more complicated than the hard and fast rules in place currently 
which focus only on the outcome of expenditures made and whether they increase the 
capital value of the shared property. A more detailed enquiry as suggested is better 
able to account for the rights and liabilities of co-owners in accordance to the 
reasonableness of their behaviour. 
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CHAPTER IV – RENTS AND PROFITS 
 
Cooke notes that there are few cases post 1925
168
 (after important amendments to the 
Law of Property Act 1925) which discuss a co-owner’s obligation to account for rent 
and profits, suggesting that perhaps the matter is ‘too obvious to be litigated’169. In the 
UK, joint owners are now trustees and if one fails to account to the other for his share 
of rent or profits, the other may bring an action for breach of trust.
170
 Similarly, the 
US cases hold that the occupying co-owners are accountable for rents received from 
third parties in their capacity as trustee for their co-owners.
171
 However, an analysis of 
the historical development of the rules in Australia gives rise to some complexities. 
 
A Under Common Law 
 
Prior to 1705, a co-owner who took more than their share of the profits accruing from 
the land, by itself,
172
 was not accountable to the other co-owners at common law.
173
 
The common law operated under the theory that the co-owners were, in effect, 
partners,
174
 and possession by one was therefore possession by all. By treating the co-
owners as one entity, the result is that ‘no man can sue himself or be both plaintiff and 
                                                             
168 After the repeal of the Administration of Justice Act 1705 (otherwise known as Statutes 4 and 5 Anne, c3, s27) 
by the Law of Property (Amendment) Act 1924 s 10. 
169 Elizabeth Cooke, 'Equitable Accounting' (1995)  (09/01) Conveyancer & property lawyer 391, 398. 
170 See s10 of the Law of Property (Amendment) Act 1924 . 
171 Neubeck v Neubeck 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 119 Atl. 26 (1922). 
172 Circumstances where an occupying co-owner would have an obligation to pay compensation include if the 
occupying co-owner had been constituted bailiff or receiver of the other co-owners. 
173 Peacock v Hanson (1864) 3 S.C.R. (NSW) 191. 
174 Hamilton v Conine, 28 Md. 635 (1868). 
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defendant in the same action’.175 In the absence of an agreement as to the sharing of 
profits, the aggrieved co-owner could only seek redress in equity.
176
 Similarly in the 
US, an occupying co-owner was not accountable for anything received from the 
common estate and could lawfully appropriate all rents and profits to his own 
benefit.
177
 Although simple in its application and operation, this presumption of 
seamless co-operation between co-owners and their treatment as one entity is 
unrealistic in circumstances where they do not in fact consider themselves as partners 
or where there is no conversation between the absentee and occupying co-owners.  
 
The common law treatment of co-owners does not take into account the obligations 
that partners have towards each other. For example, s 44 of the Partnership Act NSW 
(1892) deals with business partners and provides that in settling accounts between 
partners after a dissolution of partnership, losses will be paid out of firm profits before 
net profits are paid to each partner ratably.  This can be applied to the context of co-
ownership where the business can be viewed as the shared property and the profits as 
the rental income. Despite their voluntary non-occupation (i.e. not by an ouster), an 
absentee co-owner is still a joint owner and thus should be entitled to profits arising 
from the property while being simultaneously liable for obligations or liabilities that 
accrue.
178
 This accountability mechanism would be a way in which an absentee co-
owner who wishes to claim rental income from the shared property can be made to 
                                                             
175 Kennedy v M’Fadon, 3H. & J. 194 (1810). 
176 Browne on Actions at Law, 132 (45 Law Lib., 99). 
177 Hill v Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 17, 170A 154 (1934). 
178 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60; Williams v Williams (1899) 81 LT 163; Noack v Noack (1959) VR 137. 
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respect the co-ownership relationship. 
 
B Under the Statute of Anne 
 
To resolve the lack of general redress, Parliament enacted Statutes 4 and 5 Anne, c3, 
s27 (‘the Statute of Anne’). This statute provided that an action might be brought and 
maintained by one co-owner against another, as bailiff,
179
 for receiving more than 
their just share or portion. The statutory action applied both at law and in equity but 
only for rents actually received from third parties.
180
 The US has also awarded an 
absentee co-owner rents actually received from third parties, treating their claim as an 
implied agreement that the occupying co-owner should manage the property and 
collect rentals.
181
  This is analogous to the UK approach in which the occupying co-
owner is deemed to be a trustee for the absentee co-owner. 
 
However, the English courts construed the provision in a way that if benefits are 
received by the occupying co-owner as a result of his or her own exertions, there is no 
requirement to account to fellow co-owners.
182
 For example, the occupying co-owner 
of the shared farm in Henderson v Eason
183
 who had managed it and received all the 
produce which he marketed, was able to retain for himself the proceeds of sale.
184
 
                                                             
179 In this context, ‘bailiff’ means ‘a servant that has the administration and charge of lands, goods and chattels, to 
make the best benefit for the owner, against whom an action of account lies, for the profits which he has raised or 
made, or might by his industry or care have raised or made’. See Barnum v Landon, 25 Conn. 137, 149 (1856). 
180 Squire v Rogers [1979] 39 FLR 106, 121-122. 
181 Hill v Jones, 118 Conn. 12, 17, 170A 154 (1934). 
182 Henderson v Eason (1851) 17 Q.B. 701. 
183 (1851) 17 QB 701; 117 ER 1451. 
184 Henderson v Eason [1851] 17 Q.B. 701, 721. 
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This is subject to the qualification that if the occupying co-owner’s act amounts to the 
complete destruction of the common property, he or she will be liable in an action in 
trespass to the other co-owners, as discussed in chapter II.
185
  
 
A similar principle has been adopted by the US. For example, in Fazzio v Rarick (in 
re Fazzio),
186
 the occupying co-owner who was in exclusive possession and who used 
his own labor and expenditures to farm the land did not have to account to the co-
owner out of possession for profits or any federal government farming subsidies 
received along similar lines of reasoning to Henderson v Eason.
187
 Although this 
paper does not deal with the Canadian jurisdiction, an interesting Canadian case worth 
noting is Spelman v Spelman,
188
 which held that an occupying co-owner need not 
account for income arising from using the premises as a boarding-house (since there 
was provision of services e.g. meals, laundry generated by his own labour), as 
opposed to the rental income generated by leasing property.
189
 An application of these 
principles however, produces a commercial outcome where the only consideration 
becomes whether the benefits are conferred by third parties or a result of the labour of 
the occupying co-owner. The rights and obligations that govern the co-ownership 
relationship are blatantly overlooked. For example, the principle ignores that the 
occupying co-owner had the benefit of sole occupation in order to work the land and 
thereby derive profits. As no occupation fee would be payable (assuming that none of 
                                                             
185 Jacobs v Seward (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 464. 
186 180 B.R. 263 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1995). 
187 Black v Black, 91 Cal. App.2d 328, 332, 204 P. 2d 950 (1949). 
188 [1944] 2 DLR 74. 
189 See for example, Spelman v Spelman [1944] 2 DLR 74; King v King [1944] 4 DLR 796; Reid v Reid (1978) 87 
DLR 370. 
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the four exceptions discussed above apply) there appears to be some injustice done to 
the absentee co-owner.  
 
Instead, the rules should focus on the extent to which there is co-operation between 
co-owners, not in the form of a partnership so that there is no need for accounting, but 
on the assumption that there is an implicit obligation that arises incidentally to the co-
ownership relationship under which co-owners agree to account to the others. The 
first question should be whether the occupying co-owner has sought the consent of the 
absentee co-owner for using the shared property. If there is no reasonable explanation 
for not seeking consent (such as the co-owners agreeing to treat the relationship as a 
partnership), then the income derived from the property should be fully accountable 
according to share of ownership in the property, notwithstanding that it may have 
been the result of the occupying co-owner’s labour because they must account for the 
use of that property. For example, in Squire v Rogers,
190
 the shared property was used 
by the occupying co-owner, Mr Squire, as a business of ‘a caravan and cabin park’.191 
Mr Squire did not contact Ms Rogers to request her consent to his use of the property 
because he believed that ‘she would not be entitled to any income from that 
property’.192 The court noted that the submission may have been intended to raise an 
equitable defence of laches or estoppel by conduct, but was not made out.
193
  
 
                                                             
190 (1979) 39 FLR 106. 
191 As in the case of Squire v Rogers (1979) 39 FLR 106, 124. 
192 Squire v Rogers (1979) 39 FLR 106, 122. 
193 Ibid. 
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If Ms Rogers did not know about Mr Squire’s activities on the property (which she 
did)
194
, the case could very well have held that Mr Squire’s failure to communicate 
with Ms Rogers about his use of the property was unreasonable, thereby entitling Ms 
Rogers not only to the rents and revenue of the common property itself, but also the 
profits which Mr Rogers may have made by use and occupation of the property 
common (e.g., fees for his services in running the cabin park).
195
 But this is under the 
proviso that Ms Rogers contribute to all necessary outgoings (and not just the whole 
amount expended on improvements
196
) of the property. 
 
C Off-setting Rents with Improvements and Repairs 
 
In the case where the absentee co-owner makes a claim for rent, this will be offset by 
the full amount of the improvements made by the occupying co-owner (not just the 
lower of the amount expended and the increase in value), assuming that the absentee 
co-owner acquiesced in the making of the improvements.
197
 This acquiescence was 
implied in Squire v Rogers, from Ms Rogers’ knowledge that Mr Squire was 
managing the property and making improvements to it.
198
. If no consent can be 
implied, the absentee co-owner should be allowed a share of the rental income 
without having to account for the expenditure on improvements. 
 
                                                             
194 Ibid, 125. 
195 Ibid, 124. 
196 Ibid, 127-128. 
197 Ibid, 127-128. 
198 Ibid, 125. 
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However, while improvements may affect the value of the rent, outgoings incurred for 
the maintenance of the property, in the nature of necessary repairs as described in 
chapter II, are arguably essential expenditures to derive any rental income at all. This 
amount should be off-set against the rental income to more accurately reflect the 
absentee co-owner’s contribution to the gain of rental income, than just the amount 
for improvements. While the law currently takes into consideration improvements, it 
is not considering the use of the property by the occupying co-owner, nor the non-
lasting repairs made to the property adequately. 
 
In contrast in the US, there is an acknowledgment of the importance of maintenance 
in the accounting of rents and profits. An occupying co-owner who collects rents and 
profits from third persons is able to deduct the amounts paid for preservation and 
protection of the property such as taxes and other common obligations and necessary 
repairs and additions, during the period the rents are collected.
199
 It is reasonable to 
assume that in making a claim for the rental income, an absentee co-owner will agree 
to contribute to the expenses necessary in obtaining that income. For example, in the 
US case of Palanza v Lufkin,
200
 the occupying co-owner made repairs of a non-lasting 
nature e.g. replacing fixtures and appliances in the kitchen and bathroom and making 
repairs to the roof.
201
 The amount for these repairs were off-set against the rental 
income owed so that no net amount was payable to the absentee co-owner.
202
 The 
                                                             
199 Ochoa v McCush, 213 Cal. 426, 2 P. 2d 357 (1931). 
200 804 A.2d 1141. 
201 Palanza v Lufkin 2002 ME 804 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Dana J). 
202 Ibid, 1146. 
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rationale can be treated analogously to the Anglo-Australian position regarding 
improvements; that is, a co-owner should not be able to take the benefit of the 
increased value of the property (or here, the benefit of rents derived from third parties) 
without contributing to the expenses incurred to derive that increase in value (or here, 
rental income).
203
 
 
D Repeal of the Statute of Anne 
 
Although the Statute of Anne now does not formally apply in some Australian 
jurisdictions, it appears that the substantive effect has not changed. In South Australia, 
Tasmania and Western Australia, the Statute of Anne continues to apply. The Northern 
Territory,
204
 Queensland
205
 and Victoria,
206
 however, have repealed the Statue of Anne 
but enacted specific statutory provisions which operate in a similar manner to it but 
without the concepts of trustee or bailiff. In NSW and the ACT, the Statute of Anne 
has been repealed but not been replaced with a substitute provision.
207
 There have 
been conflicting interpretations as to the effect of the repeal in these states. For 
example, Meagher J (with whom Mahoney JA agreed), held in Forgeard v 
Shanahan
208
 that apart from statute, there existed no liability in a co-owner to account 
                                                             
203 Leigh v Dickeson (1884) 15 QBD 60; Williams v Williams (1899) 81 LT 163; Farrington v Forrester (1893) 2 
Ch 461; Noack v Noack (1959) VR 137. 
204 See s45 of the Law of Property Act 2000 (NT). 
205 See s43 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). 
206 See s28A of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic). S28A applies to accounting in respect of all property, not simply 
land and goods e.g. intellectual property. 
207 In NSW, the Act was repealed by the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969. 
208 (1994) 35 NSWLR 206. 
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for rents received from third parties.
209
 The repeal (on recommendation of Law 
Reform Commissioners with whom His Honour described as ‘high-minded but 
ignorant’210), meant that co-owners seeking an account in these circumstances would 
be in the same position prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne.
211
  
 
But it seems the preferred view is that an account nevertheless lies in equity under 
equity’s inherent jurisdiction to order an account between co-owners.212 This view 
was expounded by Hodgson JA in the case of Ryan v Dries,
213
 who did not agree with 
Meagher J in Forgeard v Shanahan and suggested that a court exercising equitable 
principles would treat a co-owner of property who had collected rents paid for the use 
of the property as having done so as agent for all co-owners. In NSW at least, agency 
appears to be the preferred legal vehicle on which an accounting for rents and profits 
is based. 
 
CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION 
 
A review of the framework under which the equitable accounting rules were 
developed has revealed inconsistencies and deficiencies in the rules, especially in 
respect of their rigidity and inability to adapt to circumstances introduced by the 
                                                             
209 Ibid, 222. 
210 Forgeard v Shanahan (1994) 35 NSWLR 206, 222. 
211 Ibid, 297. 
212 Strelly v Winson (1685) 1 Vern 297; 23 ER 480; Meagher RP, Heydon JD and Leeming MJ, Meagher, Gummow 
& Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (4th ed, LexisNexis Butt, 2002) at [25-065]. See also Re Tolman’s Estate 
(1928) 23 Tas LR 29, 30-31 (Crisp J). 
213 Ryan v Dries (2002) 10 BPR 19. 
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‘modern realities of co-ownership’214. In applying the equitable accounting rules, the 
primary purpose of the courts should be to give effect to the intention of the parties, 
which of course, would be most unequivocally shown by a written or oral agreement. 
In this regard, co-owners should be encouraged to, as Young suggests,
215
  anticipate 
issues that are almost certain to arise during their ownership of the property, seek 
legal advice and to reach an agreement. This is especially true of co-owners who are 
not married, as they ‘lack the benefit of a clear body of law and must instead search 
through the statutes and general case law for guidance in resolving their dispute’.216   
 
But where equitable accounting rules are engaged to resolve disputes where no 
agreement has been reached, the courts have favoured financial fairness over the 
intention of the parties. To achieve ‘fairness’ or ‘do equity between the parties,’217 the 
rules have arguably taken a wrong turn by adopting a form over substance approach 
whereby the focus on narrow aspects of the dispute e.g. the heavily criticized 
distinction between improvements and repairs have detracted from the just outcomes 
purported to be achieved. The courts have attempted to introduce exceptions to 
traditional rules, but some exceptions have resulted in deficiencies and reasoning gaps. 
For example, it is difficult to reconcile the ‘relationship breakdown’ cases with the 
traditional rules of ouster that require fault on behalf of the occupying co-owner. 
Rather, the courts now have a unique opportunity to redesign the framework in which 
                                                             
214 Conway, above 95, 210.  
215 Mark C. Young, ‘Co-ownership Agreements Between Unmarried Persons’ 5 Prob. & Prop. 16, 1991, 251. 
216 Ibid, 250. 
217 Dennis v McDonald [1982] Fam 63, 1050-1051 (Purchas J). 
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the rules are couched, an approach which may be more desirable (and easier) than 
creating exceptions to traditional rules. 
 
This paper has suggested that a more substantive approach should be adopted, which 
emphasizes the actual or implicit intention of the co-owners over financial fairness, 
but which would still form part of the co-owners’ implicit intention. This can be 
achieved by viewing the co-ownership relationship holistically and enquiring into the 
extent to which the behaviour of the co-owners conforms to a standard of behaviour 
that can be expected from a reasonable co-owner. The purpose of the proposed 
framework is to allocate the proceeds from the property that is consistent with the 
behavior of co-owners to each other and the respect shown to the co-ownership 
relationship. This paper has also taken the opportunity to consider the US approach 
which has particularly advocated for collaboration between co-owners as a primary 
consideration when accounting for their rights and liabilities. It will be interesting to 
monitor developments in the area of equitable accounting, particularly to see whether 
courts choose to redefine the framework of the current rules by, for example, adopting 
elements of the US approach. 
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